1. The head and administrator of the College of Sorbonne of the University of Paris.

2. For 4.1 (QsP), see Ebbesen 1986; Ebbesen & Pinborg 1981; Pinborg 1980; Roos 1974. For 4.2, see MacMahon 1981. For 4.3, see Ebbesen 1986; Pinborg 1971. For 5, see Ebbesen 1986; Ebbesen 1987; Pinborg 1976. For 6, see Ebbesen 1987; Rossi 1995. For 7, see Ebbesen 1986; Green-Pedersen 1973, 1984; Pinborg 1971. For 8, see Ebbesen 1986, 1998; Ebbesen & Pinborg 1981. For 10, see Ebbesen 1978; Green-Pedersen & Pinborg 1978; Pinborg 1975b.

3. For 1 (QMet), see Ebbesen 2000a, 2000b, 2001. For 4 (including QDM), see Ebbesen 2016. For 5, see Rossi 1995. For 6, see Toste 2014. For 8, see Weijers 1995.

4. For Brito’s hylomorphism in semiotics, grammar and logic, see Marmo 1994 and 2010. For Brito’s account of signification, see Mora-Márquez 2013.

5. Regarding his division into active and passive modes of signifying and understanding, Brito’s account is innovative with respect to those of earlier modist authors, such as Boethius of Dacia and John of Dacia. See Ebbesen 1980, 1998a; Marmo 1994; Rosier-Catach 1995, 2010.

6. For second intentions, see Pinborg 1974, 1975b; Ebbesen 1998a.

7. For Brito on universal assertions, see Mora-Márquez 2015a.

8. Although Brito only includes four internal senses (i.e., common sense, phantasia, estimation and memory), he is well aware that authors like Avicenna include an additional internal sense—imagination—whose operation is essentially different from that of the phantasia (cf. QDM; ed. Ebbesen: 36).

9. For the being of accidents, see Donati 2013: 344.

10. In Godfrey of Fontaines, Les Philosophes Belges, Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université vol 5: Les Quodlibets onze et douze, Les Quodlibets treize et quatorze (1932, 1935), J. Hoffmans (ed.).