Notes to Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones
1. Russell and Jones did exchange letters between 1909 and 1911, although only Jones’s side of the correspondence is preserved, so Russell clearly knew of Jones, if not her work. The exchange contains a response to a letter Russell wrote in which he appears to have clarified his response to an earlier letter by Jones – or, possibly, his response to Jones (1910a), which had just appeared in Mind (August 5, 1910); a request to attend Russell’s lectures on the principles of mathematics (November 2, 1910); a note a month later thanking Russell for allowing Jones to attend (December 1, 1910); and, finally, a note thanking Russell for agreeing to lecture at Girton on “Philosophy and Common Sense” (June 26, 1911). The letters are reproduced, with useful introduction and notes, in Thomas (2026).
2. Russell privately expressed reservations about Jones’s philosophical abilities. Regarding a forthcoming meeting of the Moral Sciences Club, which he would be unable to attend, Russell wrote to Lady Ottoline Morrell, on January 14, 1914: “poor Miss Jones (Principal of Girton, inventor of a new law of thought, motherly, prissy, and utterly stupid) is reading” (Russell 1992, 470). The utter disdain expressed here hardly simplifies matters. Possibly the hostility to Jones was due in part to her perceived “stupidity”; but there is also the very real possibility that the reverse is true and the hostility in fact colored his estimation of her abilities. On the other hand, it’s also worth bearing in mind the context of Russell’s remark—a letter to his lover. He may well, for dramatic effect, be overstating his disdain (much as he would, in a letter to Morrell the following year, overstate the impact on him of Wittgenstein’s criticisms).
3. Russell (1905, 1910) held that definite descriptions could not be assigned meanings directly, but admitted only of a contextual definition. When we provide an analysis of a sentence containing a description the F, no item corresponding to the description remains. On the contextual definition Russell favored, the F is G is defined as: something is both G and uniquely F.
